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ABSTRACT. 
In International Economics, conventional wisdom 
suggests that devaluation improves the trade balance 
for a country. This is possible because, by worsening 
the terms of trade for a country, devaluation leads to 
import substitution and enhanced competitiveness in the 
export sector. The trade balance is expected to improve 
via the J-curve, where the trade balance worsens first, 
until a country is able to adjust to the contractual 
problem. 
This project sought to identify the presence of the 
J-curve or a lack thereof in Malawi, a country in South 
Central Africa, within the contextual frame work of the 
IMF's structural adjustment programs. More precisely, 
it was hypothesized that a series of devaluations 
between 1982 and 1992 led to a wave-like pattern in the 
current account and the balance of payments. It was 
hypothesized that the trade balance was not enhanced 
because the J-curves never matured. 
The project also analyzed some key variables that 
form the foci of structural adjustment. In addition, 
the project also estimated Malawi's propensities to 
import from key trading partners. 
The findings suggested that, in some instances, the 
J-curve was indeed discernible from the data. In other 
instances, intervening variables precluded the drawing 
of hard and fast conclusions. The results also showed 
Malawi's imports to be positively sensitive to income 
and negatively sensitive to relative prices. However, 
the exchange rate does not appear to have any 
significant impact on Malawi's import trade, except for 
the case of trade with Japan. 
The project concluded that Malawi, the IMF and other 
lenders should focus on correcting structural 
imbalances and diversification of the export sector if 
Malawi's financial position is to improve enough to 
enable her to repay her outstanding debts. Deflationary 
aggregate demand policies will only sacrifice long run 
growth and development. 
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CHAPTER 1-
1.1. INTRODUCTION. 
Devaluation is a sine qua non of the International 
1'1onetary Fund's structural adjustment programs; indeed 
in some instances it has attained the status of a quid 
pro quo for borrowing from the IMF. It has been 
adopted, inter alia, to ameliorate the degenerating 
balance of payments positions of many developing 
countries. Conventional wisdom in International 
Economics suggests that, cet•ris paribus, devaluation, 
via a reduction in the real effective exchange rate, 
worsens the terms of trade for a specific country. 
Foreign goods become 1ROre expensive when measured in 
domestic prices, and hence expenditure-switching in 
favor of domestic goods should be initiated. 
Concurrently, the country's exports become more 
competitive on the international markets when measured 
in foreign prices; these events should boost net 
exports and hence the balance of payments position. 
The movement in net exports and balance of payments 
after a devaluation is expected to follow a J-shap•d 
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curve. The trade balance worsens first because a 
country needs time to adjust before it can reduce 
imports. Next, contractual agreeatents in the export 
sector prevent a short-run increase in exports as a 
short-run reaction to a devaluation. After a proper 
adjustment period, imports can be reduced and by the 
same token, exports can be increased. 
The purpose of this project is to identify the 
presence of the J-curve or the absence thereof, in 
Malawi, a country in South Central Africa. More 
precisely, it is anticipated that before the J-curve 
matures, a new devaluation initiates another J-curve, 
forming a wave of incomplete J-curves rather than a 
complete J-curve. The project will also analyze graphs 
of key econDfllic variables that far• the foci of 
structural adjust,..nt far Malawi, between 1982 and 
1992. It will also esti•ate Malawi's propensities to 
import fro.a key trading partners during the saMe time 
period. 
1.2. ~USTJFICATIQN. 
The pain associated with devaluation, as epitomized 
2 
structural adjustment prOCJra•s. In view of this pain, 
it is imperative that devaluation be able ta produce 
the desired results. If it is shaMn that devaluation 
has not Marked well, then it follows, a priori, that 
factors that constitute an i•pedilM!nt to the efficacy 
of devaluation can be sought, and their counter-
IM!asures, accordingly prescribed. 
1.3. BRIEF HISTORY OF BOP PROBLE"S. 
When the ... ber countries of the Organization of 
Petrol11U• Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised oil prices 
in 1973 and 1974, many oil-i•parting countries began 
experiencing aerious financial difficulties, (Ritter & 
Silber 1990, p143-144). The so-called third world non-
OPEC countries 1111ere hardest hit. 
At the sa .. ti .. , OPEC ... bltrs were enjoying surplus 
1BD11ey deriv..:I fratn their ail salea. Much of this new 
found wealth Ma& invested in a wide array of financial 
instru1n&nts or .. curities in many U.S. and European 
banks. These banks, in turn, loaned this money to 
struggling third world countries in a process that has 
been appropriately coined, "the recycling of 
8 
petrodollars." Ttw banks •istakenly presumed these 
loans to be safe bets. 
Holl!Klver, the global recession of the early 19eo·s 
proved this belief to be ill-conceived. Increasing 
interest rates in the U.S., reduced export earnings due 
to falling world prices for third MDrld export 
cDmfttOdities, and the secand oil shock of 1979 rendered 
principal aaortizations and interest payments 
burdensoae. Countries such as ttalawi, started falling 
behind in their debt repayments. 
This assortment of events threatened to undermine 
the stability of the global banking syst .. , and to 
prevent a potential collapse of the world banking 
syst .. , the ItF stepped in to ensure that the debt 
situation did not get out of hand. Using its lending 
and brokerage abilities as leverage, the ItF has 
proceeded to formulate econDMic refor• packages for 
countries with ailing economies as a condition for 
borrowing from the UF. The theoretical and .. pirical 
studies conducted on the role of the ltF in the global 
debt crisis, and the balance of pay .. nts proble•• 
associated with it, for least developed countries, 
far .. quite a reaaarkable cornucopia. 
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1.4. CURRENT DEBATE ON THE ROLE OF THE l"F. 
The lt'IF has come under serious criticism in the 
popular literature vis 'a vis its .ac/us op111randi. Many 
third world and developed countries· econ09ists believe 
that the lt'IF's policies are ill-advised, and even 
pernicious to grOMth and development. Popular belief 
has it that the lt'IF effectively i•plements standard 
programs for all participating countries, while paying 
little regard to case-specific sui generis phenomena in 
each particular country. 
The critics are outraged because the ll'IF's programs 
focus exclusively on restraining aggregat• expenditures 
in the economy in ord•r to free up funds for foreign 
debt-repayment. The critics •aintain that this approach 
causes recessions and consequently unemployment. 
Outtara (1986) accus•s the ll'IF of being a quid nunc 
because it tries to influence dOMestic policy, and 
Carvounis (1986) shar•s this bitter sentiment. Outtara 
believes that the IMF's programs are harmful to growth 
in the African context because conditionality is too 
harsh, and refor• too swift. All in all, the It'IF has 
been taken to task for supposedly contributing to the 
5 
believes that the Il"IF's programs are harmful to growth 
in the African context because conditionality is too 
harsh, and reform tao swift. All in all, the Il"IF has 
been taken to task for supposedly contributing to the 
sacrificing of long run growth and development in the 
developing countries. 
As for devaluation itself, Loxley (1987) feels that 
its redistributive effects are undesirable since the 
urban poor are hardest hit. Others, such as Taylor 
(1991) clai• that the intended substitution effects are 
slow and weak. They assert that devaluation affects 
real income in such a way that the responses of both 
the losers and the gainers lead to recessions and class 
acrilllOfly. 
It appears that the criticis• and animosity directed 
at the Il"IF and its l80dus Ol""r•ndi stem fratn a 
misunderstanding of its intended functions at the time 
of its creation as an international organization. The 
articles of agreement specifically and succinctly state 
the purpose of the ItF to be 1 
(i) To promote international Monetary 
cooperation through a permanent 
6 
institution which provides the 
•achinery for consultation and 
collaboration on international 
monetary problems. 
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and 
and balanced growth of international 
trade, and to contribute thereby to 
the promotion and maintenance of 
high levels of .. ploylMHlt and real 
income and to the development 
of the resources of all •e•bers as 
pri•ary objectives of economic policy. 
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to 
maintain orderly exchange arrange1nents 
among .embers, and to avoid competitive 
exchange depreciation. 
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a 
multilateral system of payments in 
respect of current transactions 
between members and in the 
7 
elimination of foreign exchange 
restrictions Mhich ha•per the 
grDNth of t«Jrld trade. 
(v) To give confidence to me•bers by 
making the Fund's resources available 
to them under adequate safeguards, thus 
providing them Mith the opportunity to 
correct maladjustMents in their balance 
of paymants without resorting to .. asures 
destructive of national or international 
prosperity. (Articles of Agreement, pl-2). 
The Fund is obligated to be guided in all its 
lending decisions by the purposes outlined in the 
articles of agreement. To this extent, the Fund's 
for•ulation of the structural adjustment programs is 
consistent Mith its designated functions as per the 
Bretton Woods agreeMents. In the popular literature, 
there has been a nagging and erroneous perception that 
the Fund is an organization catntRitted to the 
development of third world countries. This has led to 
unfortunate and unwarranted criticisms of the Fund. 
8 
However, it has beca.e inevitably clear that the 
evolution of the global debt has led the IMF to tread 
on terra incognit•. The Fund has found itself in a 
situation where it is on the verge of acting in the 
capacity of a developlM!flt organization. Perhaps this is 
an indication of the fact that the Il1F needs to revisit 
its article• 
obvious that deflationary aggregate detaand policies 
associated with adjustment progr .. s do ha•per growth 
and cause recessions in least developed countries. The 
critics advocate supply side retMtdies. 
"any of the third world debtors could still not 
afford to repay their debts even with major spending 
cuts initiated by the Fund. Their only chance of being 
able to pay back, and the Fund's and other lenders' 
only chance of getting their .aney back, is through 
long ter• growth and development. The Fund can no 
longer afford to act with .anocular and •yopic short 
run objectives in •ind. It will bit in the best interest 
of all parties involved for the Fund to accept a new, 
albeit challenging role, of assisting in the 
develo.,...,t process. 
9 
1.5. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
TO BALANCE OF PAV"ENTS. 
The issue of .. asuring the effects of devaluation 
on the foreign trade balance has been visited and 
revisited by many scholars since the birth of 
International Econoaics as a field. One school of 
thought emphasized the elasticity approach, another 
focussed on the absorption approach, while yet another 
1DOre recent school of thought has bean termed "the 
monetary approach". Finally, others have tried to 
initiate a marriage betMeen the two for .. r approaches. 
1.5.1. ELASTICITY APPROACH. 
Dornbusch (1980) has developed a theoretical aodel 
to explain the impact of devaluation on net exports, 
and consequently the balance of pay..nts position of 
any particular country. In his model, he purports to 
show that devaluation need not necessarily improve the 
balance of trade for a country, as per conventional 
wisd0tn. As noted earlier, devaluation is anticipated to 
boost net exports through an expenditure-switching 
10 
mechanism. When all is said and done, foreign reserves 
should rise, thereby enhancing a particular country's 
international debt-repay .. nt ability. 
Dornbusch elucidates that the scenario in which net 
exports increase does not always necessarily follDN. In 
his model, he argues that even if exportables beca.e 
more competitive, it is also true that more is paid per 
unit for the iaports that are retained. He deaonstrates 
that this cost effect doainates unless imports and 
exports are, in physical teras, sufficiently price-
elastic. This line of reasoning is l!Mboclied in the 
Marshall-Lerner condition, which requires that the sum 
of the iaport and export price-elasticities exceed 
unity, for devaluation to produce the desired results. 
Dornbusch also points out that even if the Marshall-
Lerner condition holds, expenditure-switching tONards 
domestic goods can create an incOMe effect which favors 
more spending on i•ports (the absorption effect). This 
causes sa.e "net export crDNding out" of sorts, which 
erodes away some of the gains devaluation NOUld 
otherwise achieve. Besides, some other factors such as 
inflation have to be held in check. Dornbusch 
acknONledges this potential problem by noting that the 
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assu•ption of no inflation •ay very well be 
unrealistic, especially since eKpanditure-switching 
towards domestic goods is likely to trigger inflation. 
He also Maintains that tight .anetary policy should 
accompany devaluation to pre-e•pt any inflationary 
surges. Dornbusch underscores the i•portance of these 
assu•ptions by noting that it is under these conditions 
that a nominal eKchange rate translates one for one 
into a real eKchange rate. In the Malawian conteKt, 
Silu•bu (1990) points out that, 
If sound eKchange rate •anagement •eans 
•aintaining the real eKchange rate in 
order to preserve international 
competitiveness, then prior to the 
second quarter of 1985, Malawi's 
eKchange rate tMlnaoenaent fared poorly 
on this criterion; for eKample, the early 
1982 devaluation rai!HKt the real effective 
rate for only one quarter while the 1983 
devaluation did so for only two quarters 
and then the eKchange rate appreciated 
sharply during the last siK quarters 
of the subperiod (p22). 
The elasticity approach has been accepted by many, 
including Bird, Killick and Sutton (1984). The three 
economists echo Dornbusch's approach in their analysis 
of the contextual framework within which the ll"IF seeks 
to ameliorate the balance of payments positions of 
12 
least developed countries. They concur with Dornbusch 
that devaluation will not l!IDrk if contractionary 
monetary policy is not espoused pari passu 
devaluation, to curb potential inflation. Second, their 
reasoning is in line with Dornbusch·s because they too, 
anticipate devaluation to cause domestic inflation 
through a substitution effect, and to raise the 
da.estic currency costs of debt-servicing wtwn 
eMpressed in foreign currency. 
They go even a step further by listing a host of 
other possible i•pedilMtllts. They suggest that whether 
devaluation lllDrks or not depends on whether tariffs, 
quotas and subsidies change or not. They also expect 
the outca.e to depend on whether output, income, 
da.estic expenditure, .. ploylMlllt, and the underlying 
structure of govern...,t taMation and expenditure change 
or not. 
Next, ttwy believe that far •any least developed 
countries, d..and elasticity for exports is essentially 
irrelevant because their exportable• are valued in 
foreign currencies. They expect export supply ta be 
inelastic in the short run however, because of general 
difficulties in expanding output due to substantial 
13 
structural infleKibilities and eKport sector 
bottlenecks that are commonplace in aany least 
developed countries. 
khan (1974) has used this approach to estimate 
import and eKport elasticities for some least developed 
countries. In its basic testable form, the elasticity 
approach is ••bodied in two functions which are the 
i•port and the export functions. The i•port function is 
specified as follows: 
LogH~ = aO + a1log(PF~/PD~) + a2logVd~ + u~, 
where 
H~ • i•ports in the tth period, 
PF~= Foreign CPI in the same period, 
PD~= domestic price level in the same period, 
Yd~= gross domestic product in the same period. 
u~ = the stochastic error term. 
An al of less than zero is anticipated by the law of 
demand, since PF~/PD~ measures the relative price of 
imports. An a2 of greater than zero is expected because 
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theory suggests that consumption of i•ports will be 
higher at greater levels of inca.e. The coefficients 
can be used to calculate the respective price and 
incoae elasticities since the equation is specified in 
logarithms. Esti•ating such an equation using Ordinary 
Least Squares requires •aking a couple of assu•ptians. 
First, it has to be asswned that actual i•ports equal 
the quantity de•anded of i•ports to avoid simultaneity 
bias. Second, it has to be assulMKI that the supply of 
i•ports is infinitely price-elastic to avoid the 
identification proble•. A violation of one or both of 
these assumptions MOUld lead to biased esti•ates. 
The export function is specified as follows: 
LagX~ = bO + b1log(PF~/PD~) + b2lagV•~ + v~, 
where 
x~ = exports in the tth period, 
PF~= Foreign CPI in the sa .. period, 
PD~= dOfftestic price level in same period, 
v·~= gross foreign incOtRe in the sa .. period, 
v~ = the stochastic error term. 
15 
A bl of greater than zero is anticipated by the law 
of supply since PF~/PD~ is a relative measure of the 
price of exports. Further11tOre, a b2 of greater than 
zero is expected because theory suggests a positive 
relationship between foreign income and domestic 
exports. Two assumptions are in order here, ipso facto 
the import function case. First, actual exports must be 
expected to equal the quantity demanded of them to 
prevent simultaneity bias. Second, the demand for 
exports must be perfectly elastic to avoid the 
identification problem. A violation of one or both of 
these assumptions would lead to biased estimates. Since 
the equation is specified in logarithms, the 
coefficients can be used to calculate the respective 
income and price elasticities. 
1.5.2. ABSORPTION APPROACH. 
The elasticity approach has been met with criticism 
because of its inability to incorporate absorption 
effects. Due to this weakness, Alexander (1952) opted 
for the absorption approach. With this approach, 
B = V - A, 
16 
where 
B = Exports, 
V = BNP, 
A = Absorption = Consu•ption + Investment + Government 
spending. 
But A = cV - d 
where 
c = marginal propensity to absorb, 
d = direct effect of devaluation on absorption, 
SD that 
B = Y - (cY - d) = (1 - c)Y + d. 
If c is greater than or equal to 1 then devaluation 
will not i•prave the trade balanc•. The last equation 
can be estimated using Two Stage Least Squares, with A 
as the instrumental variable. 
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1.5.3. THE MQNETARV APPROACH. 
The .anetary approach to the balance of payments 
('1ABP) finds its roots in Hume's specie flow .. chanism, 
Nhich Silu•bu (1992, pl) says Nas rediscovered, revived 
and popularized in the 1960's as an alternative 
approach to balance of payments (BOP). In brief, the 
t1ABP model postulates that the overall balance of 
payments 111&asured by, for exatRple, international 
reserves, is i•pacted by present i•balances in the 
money .arket, on both the supply and d .. and sides. With 
a relatively stable or effectively controlled exchanQe 
rate syst .. , excess money supply encourages increased 
expenditures an goods. This trend extends to increased 
acquisition of foreign goods, services and assets by 
domestic residents. 
The doNnside of this scenario is that these 
acquisitions have to be financed by the depletion of 
foreign exchange thereby NOrsening the balance of 
payments. The outflow of reserves consequently reduces 
11D11ey supply until equality Nith de•and is achieved. An 
excess of 1111Dney d .. and leads to opposite adjust•ents 
leading to reserve inflON and an expansion in the money 
18 
supply until an equilibriu. restores the balance of 
payments. 
Consider the dyna•ic money •arket equilibrium, 
Mhere 
such that 
"D = "'-ney d .. and 
P1S = "'-nay supply. 
Changes in money supply are determined by proportional 
changes in high powered money, Mhich is changes in 
international reserves and central bank credit such 
that 
P1S=u H=u( IR+ CBC) 
Mhere 
u = the proportionality factor (multiplier) 
19 
IR = International reserves 
CBC = Central Bank Credit. 
The 1BOney account of the BOP is Bn which is simplified 
to IR, 
therefore 
MS = Bn + CBC 
so that equilibriwa can be written as 
MD = Bn + CBC 
or 
Bn • MD - CBC. 
It baca.es •vident then, that a BOP surplus (Bn>O) 
i•plies that domestic residents increase the demand for 
balances by IROre than the Central Bank increases its 
supply. This .. ans that funds must flow into the 
econa.y to cover the lack of funds domestically. 
20 
To see what a devaluation does, one should consider 
the consumer's purchases of traded goods (i•portables 
and exportables). The domestic price level is a 
weighted index of these goods1 
P'= flPx + (1-t!)Pm 
where for a small country, these are determined by 
world markets. Pm = (1/e)Pm• and Px = (1/e)Px• 
(Note that this is the only instance in which the 
exchange rate is given as foreign/domestic. For the 
statistical anlaysis of this project it is given as 
domestic/foreign.) P•* and Px• are unit values of 
imports and exports respectively, and e is the exchange 
rate. 
By substitution, 
p• = [(1/e)Px•] + (1-@)[(1/e)Pm•J, 
p• = (1/e)[flPx• + (1-@)Pm•1 
p• = (1/e)P* 
where 
P• = world foreign currency price of consumption 
21 
basket. 
A devaluation (a fall in e) raises (1/e) and p• so 
that H/P' falls. This fall in real aoney farces 
consu .. rs ta spend less (a decrease in absorption) so 
as to increase savings. Although the domestic price 
level increases, the relative price of exports to 
imports has not changed• 
Pm/Px = [(1/e)Pa•]l[(l/e)Px•l = Pa•/Px•. 
The battoa line of the aonetary approach then is that 
the movement of absorption towards equilibriu• is 
purely .anetary rather than a result of the flaw of 
goods ( ie. the fall in e lowers iaports as it raises 
exports since Pa/Px increases). This analysis coaes 
form Dornbusch (1980). 
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1.5.4. THE INTEGRATED APPROACH. 
The absorption approach failed as an i•prov1HMH1t 
upon the elasticity approach because it left out the 
price effects eaphasized by the elasticity approach. 
After some criticis•, Alexander (1959) att .. pted to 
unify the elasticity and the absorption approaches. 
After .. theMatical manipulations, the resulting aodel 
is as follows: 
B • Bp+(tF!tfll'FSf>CCk/1-k>Bh+Jf/r(1-k)J+ttPMh/tf>Sh(Jh) 
l+(tFtlh/ttPSh)+(tlPMf/tlPSf) 
where 
B = change in foreign trade balance, 
Bp = change in balance occasioned by price effects, 
Bh = balance before devaluation for the devaluing 
country, 
MPttf = •arginal propensity to i•port from the devaluing 
country by the rest of the NOrld, 
MPSf = marginal propensity to save of the rest of the 
world, 
MPMh = marginal propensity to import of devaluing 
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country, 
t1PSh = •arginal propensity to save of devaluing 
country, 
k = percentage of devaluation, 
r = predevaluation rate of exchange, 
Jh = direct effect of devaluation on hoarding out of 
a given money income in devaluing country, and 
Jf = direct affect of devaluation on hoarding out of 
a given inc01Re in the rest of the world. 
This review of the alternative approachlts to the 
balance of pay..,.ts should fa•iliarize the reader Mith 
the background of past and current trends of thought 
that have evolvlld in the field of International 
Econa.ics, Mith ragards to devaluation and balance of 
paymants. It should help the reader understand better 
the objectives and the results of this project. Chapter 
two affords a ca.prehensive su ... ry of the ttalaNian 
econa.y in Nhich the hypotheses of the project Nill be 
tested. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
2.1. A BU""ARY OF THE l"F 
IN "ALAMI. 
'1ukhoti, Curtis and Putt (1986) conducted a very 
useful study on the role of the If'IF's presence in 
Malawi while at the sa .. time affording us with a 
historical context of the "alawian aconoay. Thay 
hypothesize that the If'IF's conditionality has, at bast, 
achieved modest and qualified successes in "alawi, and 
that the .ain obstacles standing in the way of growth, 
and hence a salubrious balance of pay.ants position are 
structural in nature. Sotne of the cited obstacles were 
unpredictable 111teather patterns, adverse NDrld prices 
for "8lawian exportables, and perhaps taast 
devastatingly, disruptions in the rudimentary 
transportation syst1H1. 
Next, they offer a historical background of the 
country's post-independence development strategy. At 
independence, in 1964, "alawi was one of the poorest 
countries in the NDrld, and remains frustratingly so. 
An insur1BDUntable lack of natural resources such as 
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minerals and petroleu• dictated that agriculture would 
evolve to be the country's econa111ic base. Tobacco, 
cotton, tea, sugar, groundnuts, and to sc::.e eMtent 
•aize, have developed into Malawi's l80St i•portant 
eMports. Two major parastatals were designed to 
orchestrate the viability of these exports and 
development. These t...a parastatals are:- Agricultural 
DevelopMent and Marketing Corporation (ADt1ARC) and the 
Malawi DevelopMent Corporation (MDC). 
These two parastatals, alongside Press Holdings (a 
quasi-public conglDMerate), have beca.e channels 
through which savings are .abilized and syphoned into 
investments. ADttARC has traditionally been responsible 
for the MObilization of domestic savings, and the 
buying of the exportables frDM SDMR 1.2 •illion saall 
holder farmers. ADttARC then turns around and sells the 
exportables abroad for profit. Earnings g11nerated in 
this •anner by ADttARC in the 1970's were re-invested in 
other sectors of the econatny, including the thriving 
estate sector. Press Holdings and MDC indulged in joint 
ventures with multi-national ca.panies such as LONRHO 
(a London-based pan-African conglOMerate) in various 
sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing and finance. 
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Due to increasing oil prices in the late 1970's, the 
parastatals registered sa.e •ajar losses. Other 
factors, such as debt-servicing costs, unprofitable 
ventures, corruption, and outright ineffectual 
manage.ent also contributed to these losses. 
Transportation probl .. s have also exacerbated the 
Naes of the already fragile econa.y. "alaMi's lack of 
oceanic coastline has left her Mith feM alternatives in 
the May of i•port and export shipment routes. Most of 
"alaMi's shipments in the 1970's Mitra conducted through 
the ports of Beira and Nacala on the Moza•bican Indian 
Ocean coast. There are tMO railMay lines running from 
"•laMi to the tMO ports. Since 1979, the civil Mar in 
Moza.bique has disrupted shipments because rebels 
belonging to Rasistencia Nacional di Mocambiqua 
(RENAl10), seeking to pressure the "alaMian government 
to their side, have periodically and systeMatically 
incapacitated the railMay lines so as to render them 
i•passable. BetMeen 1982 and 1984, shipM!llts came to a 
virtual halt. This lead to delays in the delivery of 
crucial imports such as petroleum and fertilizers1 
inevitably, inflation rates of levels in excess of 15Y. 
p.a. "8re inevitably triggered. The country has since 
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been forced to send its li•ited •ilitary 1RUscle to 
ttaza•bique to help aafeguard the railway lin•s. 
Transportation costs ruave sky-rocketed as costly road 
transportation through Zambia and Botswana to the South 
African ports of Durban and Port Elizab9th has been 
adopted as an alternative. 
The govern.-nt has historically run fiscal d•ficits 
since independence; economic success has bettn .. asured 
in ter•s of declining deficits as a percentage of GDP. 
The 197o·s go dOMn in ttalawian history as the "'golden 
years"'; indeed i•pressive grDMth rates in exc••s of 6X 
Mere registered 11 and the first ail shock Ma& absorbed 
fairly Mell. The country reached a watershed in 1979; 
declining real prices of exports 11 the second oil shack, 
and rising prices of i•ports due to transportation 
probl .. s put pressure on the country•s foreign 
reserves. Debt-servicing requirements an ca..ercial 
loans 11 obtained to financ• d•ve10.....,t 11 ca .. of age as 
well, and as such helped MOrsen the balance of payments 
position. Other factors, such as the global recession 
and recurring droughts added insult to injury. 
The govern-nt turned to the UF in 1979 when 
foreign reserves fell precipitously from $37 million to 
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-$33 million between 1977 and 1979. "alawi and the Il1F 
agreed an a two and half year stand-by arrangement for 
the period beginning in early 1980, and ending an 
Dec-ber 31, 1981. The goal of this arrangltMl!llt was to 
enhance the degree of financial stability by providing 
a basis for correcting structural imbalances. 
Transportation probl .. s •ade it difficult for the 
governMent to abide by the original conditions, and 
this n•cessitated a replace.ent of the quan d•• 
arrangement by a new one, starting in April of 1980 and 
ending in March of 1982. Reduced levels of doaestic 
credit and govern-nt borrowing Mitre targeted. Other 
.. asures included restraint in governMRnt spending 
coupled with increases in eMcises, i•port duties, wage 
restraints, and positive real interest rates. 
As a reward for being obsequious, "alawi was 
accorded an eMtended fund facility on S.pt-ber 19, 
1983, for a three year period, to the tune of SDR100 
•illion. This was in concurrence with a $55 •illion 
World Bank loan. For unpublicized reasons, the fund has 
been inoperative sine die since late 1985. "easures 
associated with this facility comprised liberalization 
of the pricing syste•, reduction in govern1Rent 
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expenditures, and flexible interest and exchange rates. 
Medium ter• objectives included targets of 3.5X GDP 
grDMth, BX inflation, and a reduction of the current 
account deficit froa 8.3X of BDP to BX by the end of 
1983, and down to 5.6X by 1985. Parastatal reform was 
initiated, and credit contraction retRained part and 
parcel of the objectives. 
Devaluation has been periodically used as an 
expenditure-switching instru.ent; in fact, every year 
between 1982 and 1991 has seen a depreciation in the 
kwacha, with the exception of 1984. The nominal 
percentage range of devaluation has fallen between 10X 
and 20%. In April of 1982, the "alawi kwacha was 
devalued by 15% and between 1983 and 1984 it was 
devalued by 12%. To prevent any appreciation in the 
nominal exchange rate, a trade-weighted basket was 
adopted to replace a previous peg to the SOR. Again, in 
April of 1985, the kwacha was devalued by 15% to 
offset appreciation which took place since the extended 
fund facility of 1983. In August of 1986, the kwacha 
was depreciated once again by lOX. 
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Chronological Sequence of Devaluations. 
01 24 April 1982 by 15X. 
02 17 Sept-bltr 1983 by 12X. 
03 2 April 1985 by 15X. 
D4 16 August 1986 by lOX. 
05 7 February 1987 by 20X. 
06 16 January 19BB by 15X. 
07 24 ..arch 1990 by 7X. 
•her• 01, 02 etc. denote the nu•bltr of the devaluation. 
In order to encourage increases in the aggregate 
supply, prices for the small holder exportable 
ca..odities titere raised by 10X bet""91Hl 1983 and 1984. 
Under the tutelage of the World Bank, a .. thodology •as 
established for determining the prices paid for 
exportable crops. The objective •as to move tmtards 
parity Mith international prices. Urban Mages .are 
restrained pri•arily to arrest inflation, and 
secondarily to trigger .ability tmtards the rural areas 
•here agriculture takes place. 
According to the study, subsidy retnaval has produced 
&Dtfte self-defeating results. For example, the 
cancellation of fertilizer subsidies to small holder 
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far•ers, as recommended by the Il'1F, caused many small 
holder f ar .. rs to go under because they could not bear 
the brunt of the increased costs. Next, rtHKJval of 
transportation subsidies also led to critical shortages 
of crucial i•ported physical capital. 
The study concluded that i•ple.antation of the Fund 
progra•s has been efficient, but that the results have 
been far froa satisfactory. Balance of pay.ants and 
inflation targets Mere believed to have been overly 
opti•istic. The study also concluded that the country's 
co•petitiveness had i•proved .. rginally since i•port 
costs re•ained high. The current account has 
traditionally fluctuated precariously, in a •anner that 
is frustratingly inconsistent with the ItF's 
objectives. Qualified successes of the ItF were 
concluded to have been cleaning up of the governlH!flt 
budget, eli•ination of inefficiencies in the 
parastatals, and increased productivity of the s•all 
holder far••· 
The study suggested that the Il1F should focus on 
eli•ination of structural problem• and i•balances 
rather than deflationary aggregate d11t11and policies. 
Also, transportation proble•s need long tar• economic 
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and gee-political solutions. NeMt, the study encouraged 
diversification of eMports as Malawi looks to the 
future. Finally, the study also highlighted a need for 
Malawi to hold in check her robust population growth; 
at 3.2X per anu•, it wipes away any tneager economic 
gains. 
2.2. POLICY AND "ACROECONO"JC TRENDS. 
(1965-1990). 
2.2.1. t1ACROECONOt1IC CREDIT POLICY. 
One of the post-independence government policy 
measures favored the tightening of domestic credit as a 
means of demand management. Silumbu (1992, p13) 
identifies three phases that are distinguishable in 
terms of policy stance adopted, design and 
implementation. First, a piece-meal approach was 
adopted in what amounted to an eMperimental mode by the 
monetary authorities, to permit the regulation of 
credit conditions via isolated monetary instruments. 
Three pivotal changes occurred between 1970 and 1975. 
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First, partial nationalization of the banking syste• 
Mas effected. Second, a selected credit approach Mas 
adapted, ta •ake the banking sector 1aare responsive ta 
Mhat Silwabu (1992) calls indigenous corporate 
enterprises. This approach favored the tobacco 
plantation subsector Mhich had been in financial 
doldru•s since the great depression of the 1930's. 
Finally, financial instruaaants to be used for the 
financing of governMent agricultural schemes Mere 
introduced. 
The daganeration of balance of payments bltt111H11m 1976 
and 1979 prompted Monetary authorities to espouse Mhat 
Silu•bu (1992) has termed a package-deal approach to 
credit control. In 1976, foreign exchange, Mhich Mas 
essentially depleted for all practical purposes for the 
first ti .. since 1964, could not be depended on to 
repay ca..ercial banks' foreign debt. The piece-meal 
approach Mas divorced by the authorities in an attempt 
ta rejuvenate the foreign asset position. The package-
deal approach involved the use of traditional 
restrictive ..anetary instru1111nts such as increased 
interest rates, and redefinition and enforc..ant of the 
liquid asset ratio of 25X. The tNO quasi-governmental 
commercial banks which are the Commercial Bank of 
ttalawi (CottBANK) and the National Bank of Malawi <NB), 
along with the New Building Society (analogous to a 
Savings and Loans), and the Post Office Savings Bank 
(POSS) were directed to exercise extreme restraint in 
extending credit, with the agricultural sector being 
accorded credit priority. 
The failure of the 1977 economic recovery to improve 
balance of payments coerced the government into 
reinforceiaent of the 1976 IRE!asures. In addition, 
financial institutions were directed to quantitatively 
li•it their credit extension to 1.5X of total credit 
available per month. Again, preference was extended to 
the agricultural sector. Credit for consu•ption goods, 
i•ported non-agricultural and non-essential 
intermediate goods was severely discouraged by the 
•onetary authorities. 
A lack of i•provetMtnt in the balance of payments 
necessitated the introduction of a comprehensive credit 
policy package August 10, 1979 (Silumbu 1992, p15). New 
measures were introduced as part and parcel of this 
approach. First, exchange controls were enhanced. This 
included the cancellation of previous foreign exchange 
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approvals due for expiration on S.pte•ber 3, 1979, for 
which new approvals had to be sought. Second, selective 
exchange control ai..c:t at reducing i•portation of goods 
believed to have bean exorbitantly stock-piled was 
initiated. Third, an i•port deposit scheMe requiring a 
20X deposit with the ca.mercial banks of the value of 
goods before actual receipt of the goods, and a 50X 
deposit on custa.s duties and clearing dues at entry 
ports was put into effect. 
Next, for the very firat ti .. the govern.-nt budget 
and the quaai-public enterpriaes were identified as 
crucial elements to the settlement of the balance of 
payments •aladies. A concerted effort to syphon credit 
fro. the public sector to the private sector for the 
purpose of generating vigorous economic activity and 
export-led grOMth was pursued. This peackage also acted 
as a catalyst for subsequent stand-by arrangeMents and 
other necessary stabilization-cu•-structural adjust1R&nt 
paraphernalia. 
2.2.2. EXCHANGE RATE 1'1ANABEtENT. 
Within the contextual fraftHttlltOrk of exchange rate 
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regimes, Malawi has exercised a number of pegging 
alternatives. A few months after independence in 1964, 
Malawi put forward her own currency, the Malawi pound, 
pegged to the British sterling. Trends in international 
exchanges have influenced monetary authorities to make 
a nu•ber of adjustments to the exchange rate. Like an 
obedient daughter, Malawi devalued her currency by 14X 
on November 20, 1967, following the British devaluation 
of the sterling on November 20, 1967. On February 14, 
1971, the Halawi pound was decimalized and christened 
the Halawi kwacha, pegged at HK2 ta the sterling, 
(Silumbu 1992, plB). 
Silumbu (1992, plB), alludes to the need to 
recognize that all this took place during the last 
phases of the Bretton Woods system, established in 1944 
and based on a fixed, albeit adjustable exchange rate 
regime, which went to shambles in 1971 with the 
naissanc• of the generalized managed floating system. 
The Smithsonian Agreement, which existed between 
December 18, 1971 and Harch 1973, saw the realignment 
of the sterling from US$2.40 to US$2.60; not 
surprisingly, Halawi fallowed suit. In June of 1972, 
Britain broke away from the agreement and allowed the 
37 
sterling to float. 
This .ave by Britain prompted MalaMian officials to 
shun the single currency pegging option in favor of 
1RUltiple pegs. The first atta.pt involved a peg to a 
weighted average of the sterling and the US$ betMeen 
Nav .. ber 1973 and June 1975. This move Mas supposed to 
prevent depreciation of the kMacha and to narrDM its 
margin of fluctuation that had been rather Mide prior 
to this ti-. 
When the IttF changed the valuation of the Special 
Drawing Right (SOR) frata gold and the USS to a basket 
of several currencies in July of 1974, MalaMi pegged 
the kwacha to the SOR at MK1.05 to the SOR. This status 
qua was •aintained betMeen June of 1975 and January of 
1984. The rationale once again Mas to •inimize the 
margin of fluctuation. Further81Dre, consensus had it 
that the transmission into the country of i•ported 
inflation would be attenuated in the Make of the ail 
shocks of the •id-197o·s, (Silu•bu 1992, p19). Finally, 
on January 17, 1984, the kwacha Mas pegged ta a basket 
of seven currencies ca.prising the US dollar, the 
British sterling, the Gar•an mark, the South African 
rand, the French franc, the Japanese yen and the Dutch 
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guilder. 
2.2.3. INCOME AND PRICES. 
Popular belief recommends analyzing economic growth 
and perfor•ance in MalaNi in two distinctive periods: 
the pre-1979 and the post-1979. Silu•bu (1992, p23) 
nicely su ... arizes growth in the following manner: the 
economy experienced an i•pressive record of economic 
growth from independence through 1978. Indeed, the 
197o·s decade goes dDMn as the "golden age" for 
MalaNi's economy. For exa•ple, having cruised from 4.3X 
in 1964-69 to 6.lX during 1970-79, real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) posted a negative groNth rat• of 2.4X in 
1980-81, before convalescing at a 3.6X rate in 1982-85, 
a rate s .. 11er than that of the 197o·s. The recovery 
that started in 1982 peaked at a growth rate of 4.6X in 
1984 and lost its potency rather swiftly to about 1.25X 
in 1986-87 before recuperating to 3.3X, 4.1X and 4.8X 
in 1988, 1989 and 1990, in that respective order. 
Unreliable population census esti•ates preclude the 
analysis of per capita GDP. 
Silumbu (1992, p23) believes that overall price 
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trends in the 1970's Mere highly influenced by oil 
shocks. Having risen from 5X in 1973, inflation rose to 
an 18% figure in 1974, as measured by the changes in 
the Blantyre City high income consu .. r price index. 
After a ma•entary decline, it rose again fra. 16% in 
1975 to 27% in 1979-1980. These increases took place in 
the face of ever-extensive price and wage controls 
enforced in the 1970's. 
Five significant factors have been associated with 
price levels in the 199o·s. These have been cited by 
Silu•bu (1992) as being the deterioration of terms of 
trade, external transport shocks, the series of 
devaluations, the Price Liberalization Progra• (PLP) 
initiated in Dec .. ber of 1983, and govern..,,t deficit 
financing. On average, inflation accelerated from llX 
during 1982-84 to 19X in 1985-87 to 32% by 1988. Anti-
inf lationary expectations of 1989 hoped for 12% 
inflation. The actual inflation figure was 15.7%. The 
dawn of 1990 saw the inflation figure recede to 11.5X. 
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2.2.4. THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. 
Malawi's balance of payments position overlies 
several structural factors bearing their marks during 
various time periods. First and perhaps most notable 
are the limitations in the export sector. Reliance on a 
few select primary export commodities •eets one of the 
criterion for the so-called iamiserization of growth 
pheno1Renon in DevelopMent Econa1tics. This phena.enon is 
punctuated by the increasing dependency on tobacco 
exports, whose share of total exports increased from 
52X and 60X, to 70X during 1976-BO, 1986-BB and 1990, 
respectively. Second, although the period covering the 
1960's up to the mid-1970's saw a IDodest import 
substitution, the period covering the latter 1970's to 
the present has been characterized by heavy imports of 
industrial inputs, which Silumbu (1992, p27) esti•ates 
to be 35X of total imports. Third, increased debt 
acquired in the late 1970's has cul•inated in debt 
crises, especially when juxtaposed with mostly negative 
capital inflows and highly conditional bilateral and 
aultilateral aid. Finally, transportation •aladies have 
led to decreased export competitiveness and inflation. 
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Prior to 1976, interest rate policy was formulated 
with the motive of inducing com .. rcial banks to borrow 
from their London-based head offices. As a result, the 
banks accumulated debt. During that period, the Central 
Bank posted positive net foreign exchange which was 
used to finance the banks· debts. This state of affairs 
changed draaatically in 1976 when net foreign exchange 
turned negative and consequently could not be used ta 
finance the banks· debts. This would appear to be the 
reason behind the 11tOnetary authorities· insistence on 
the use of credit and exchange rate policy instruments 
far the purpose of re-energizing the balance of 
paylftellts position. A cOMbination of substantial 
bilateral and 11Ultilateral aid to complement structural 
adjustment contributed to the accumulation of reserves 
towards the end of the 19eo·s. 
This review concludes the su1NRary of the Malawian 
ecanOMy. It is clear fro• the su .. ary that despite 
government efforts ta control the de•and side of the 
economy, balance of pay•ents prablet11s still persist. 
The next chapter will present and analyze the findings 
of the project. 
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CHAPTER 3-
DATA, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS. 
3.1.1. DATA. 
Data for this research project was obtained from the 
IHF International Financial Statistics and the Economic 
and Financial Review (a Reserve Bank of Malawi 
quarterly publication). All the price indices, volumes 
of imports and exports, unit values of i•ports and 
exports are given with 1980 as the base year. The index 
for industrial output, which is used as a proxy for GNP 
is given with 1985 as the base year. Any series that 
were not given with 1980 as the base were appropriately 
unified into the 1980 base. Imports and exports were 
taken CIF because that is how they were given in the 
data sources. 
3.1.2. DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES. 
Limpo = The logarithm of Malawi's imports. 
Lnagdp = The logarithm of Malawi's industrial output 
proxy for GNP). 
Lpsa = The log of South Africa's CPI/Malawi's CPI 
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Lersa 
Lpg 
Lerg 
Lpj 
Lerjp 
Lpuk 
L•ruk 
Lpusa 
Lerusa 
I•po 
Expo 
Nn•r 
Impo 
Nrer 
Nx 
Bop 
Vex pa 
Vi•pa 
1'1s 
(measure of relative prices). 
= The lag of the exchange rate between Malawi 
and South Africa. 
= The lag of Ber•any's CPI/Malawi's CPI. 
= The lag of the exchange rate bet......, Malawi 
and Germany. 
=The lag of Japan's CPI/1'1ala•i's CPI. 
= The lag of the exchange rate bet......, Malawi 
and Japan. 
=The lag of United kingdom's CPI/Malawi's CPI. 
= The lag of the exchange rate between 1'1alawi 
and United Kingdom. 
= The lag of USA's CPl/1'1alawi's CPI. 
= The lag of the exchange rate between 1'1ala•i 
and the USA. 
= 1'1ala•i's nominal i•ports. 
= 1'1ala•i·s nominal exports. 
= (kMacha/US$)x100. 
= 1'1ala•i's imports. 
= [(kMacha/US$)x(USA's CPI/1'1ala•i•s CPI)]xlOO. 
= 1'1ala•i's net exports. 
= 1'1ala•i's balance of payments. 
= 1'1ala•i's valu1119 of exports. 
= 1'1ala•i's valu .. of imparts. 
= 1'1ala•i's na.inal MDney supply (1'11). 
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Rms 
Infln 
Ncpi 
Ner 
Rer 
=Malawi's real money supply. 
= Malawi's quarterly inflation. 
= The log of Malawi's CPI. 
=Malawi's nominal exchange rate vs USA. 
= Malawi's real exchange rate vs USA. 
Dcredit =Malawi's level of nominal domestic credit. 
Rcredit =Malawi's level of real domestic credit. 
6spend =Malawi's nominal government spending. 
6bs = Malawi's government spending surplus. 
Ires =Malawi's stock of foreign exchange. 
Fass =Malawi's total holdings of foreign assets. 
3.2. &RAPHICAL INTERPRETATIONS, 
Figure 1 (Appendix A) shows a graphical illustration 
of Malawi's quarterly nominal imports and exports 
alongside natninal and real exchange rates. The first 
glance reveals an interesting relationship between the 
real and nominal exchange rates. Prior to the first 
devaluation, the natninal and real exchange rates were 
virtually one and the same. Right after the first 
devaluation a discrepancy developed and widened towards 
the end of the 19BO's. It is quite obvious that 
although the devaluations that ensued during the 19BO's 
lowered the nominal value of the kwacha, they did not 
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lower the real exchange rate, ie. the nominal exchange 
rate did not translate one for one into a real exchange 
rate. In fact, the real value of the kwacha, relative 
ta the US$, was not significantly controlled as 
evidenced by the decreasing pattern in the real 
exchange rate. This, according ta Dornbusch (1980), 
diminishes the effectiveness of the devaluation 
process. 
The first devaluation appears ta have had little 
effect on i•ports because they kept an rising slightly 
deep into the second quarter of 1983 when they fell 
ever so slightly just prior ta the second devaluation. 
Contrary to expectations, the iaports started rising 
after about two quarters proceeding the second 
devaluation; they had remained fairly constant 
i...ediately after this devaluation. The second half of 
1984 saw a decrease in imports, perhaps because 1984 
was a fairly productive year for the country and as 
such some import substitution could occur. Imports seem 
to have responded somewhat to the third and fourth 
devaluations. The fifth, sixth and seventh devaluations 
apparently accOtRplished nothing because imports took an 
upward swing during the latter half of the 198o·s. Some 
have attributed part of this increase to the 
acquisition of a new aircraft and spare parts by Air 
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Malawi, the country's only carrier. In summary, imports 
on average, fell slightly until about July of 1986. 
Exports increased throughout the duration of the 
period with sa.e ups and downs along the way. They 
responded to the first devaluation by falling and then 
picking up just before the second devaluation. They 
kept on rising and then started falling right up to the 
third devaluation. Beyond the third devaluation, they 
took on a fluctuation that could either be attributed 
to the contractual proble• or si•ply to the heavily 
fluctuating productive capacity of the country, 
influenced by unpredictable weather patterns. 
Transportation factors have also loomed large as 
anathe•a to the stability of the export sector. 
Finally, the wave-like pattern could also be 
attributable to the seasonal nature of the country's 
export commodities. This plethora of intervening 
factors precludes the drawing of any exhaustive 
conclusions. 
Figure 2 (Appendix A) is a graphical representation 
of Malawi's net exports and the balance of payments 
juxtaposed with the nominal and real exchange rates. 
The net exports did follow a J-curve between the first 
and the second devaluations, as did the balance of 
payments. Another rather shaky J-curve for both 
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variables emanates from the period betMeen the second 
devaluation and two quarters before the third 
devaluation. A rather delayed J-curve is also 
discernible bet....., the third and fourth devaluations. 
Although the fourth and fifth devaluation& "9re fairly 
cloae to each other, there does exist a sharp J-curve 
bet""9n them. Beyond the fifth devaluation, a wave-like 
pattern develops, for instance, bet....., the sixth and 
the seventh devaluations, tlltD J-curves inexplicably 
exist. This pattern st .. • fram the wave-like pattern 
exhibited by the naminal exports. This finding ..... to 
be in line with the expectations of the project. 
For the period preceding 1984, both the balance of 
pay..,,ta and net exports were fluctuating •ildly, with 
the a•plitude favoring the nevative side. Beyond that, 
the fluctuation• got worse far net exports. However, 
inspite of the swings, the balance of pay.ants do look 
sDmllttllthat slightly i•proved in the post 1984 period. 
Since the net exports did not i•prove over the sa .. 
period, it .ust follow that there was either a capital 
inflow for the latter half of the 1980·s decade or 
significant official settl...nta aa per the accounting 
relationship that exists in the balance of pay.ants 
equation. Again, it is worth .. phaaizing that the data 
by no means affords any hard and fast conclusions. 
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Seasonal fluctuation once again may be at work. 
However, time wise aggregation of the data into an 
annual series seriously diminishes the number of 
observations to be studied. 
Figure 3 (Appendix A) includes a graphical mapping 
of ttalawi's volu ... s of i•ports and exports for the 
period under study superi•posed on real and nominal 
exchange rates. After the first devaluation, the volume 
of i•ports fell and then rose before falling again 
before the second devaluation. The voluMe kept falling 
after the second devaluation and then took a sudden 
leap at the beginning of the first quarter of 1984. The 
third and fourth devaluations appear to have 
contributed to the lowered volume of i•ports in the 
interperiod. The volume also ••- to have responded to 
the fifth devaluation after a two quarter delay. It is 
harder to attribute the fall in the volume of i•ports 
to the sixth devaluation hc:>Mever, because the volume 
rose sharply after the sixth devaluation, before 
falling, about two quarters later. Beyond that, a lack 
of data prevents further analysis. 
The volu .. of exports rose almost instantly after 
the first devaluation before tu•bling prior to the 
second devaluation. The second devaluation 
reinvigorated and sustained the volume of exports up to 
49 
the quarter before the third devaluation. The third 
devaluation once again helped raise the volume of 
exports up to the first quarter of 1986. Neither the 
fourth, the fifth nor the sixth devaluation sustained 
the volwae of exports. Over the entire period, both the 
volu .. s of exports and i•ports fluctuated considerably, 
with no evident gains in the late 1990·s· over the 
early 19SO's" levels. 
Figures 4 through 10 (Appendix A) shaw trends in 
other variables that naecl to be kept under control in 
order for devaluation ta be effective. Figure 4 
exhibits the trend in ttalawi's money supply ("1). "1 
was chosen as the most desirable .. asuremetlt because 
"alawi does not have a significantly developed 
financial •arket. ttost of the financial transactions 
are conducted either with cash or d .. and deposits, both 
of which are part of "1, thus making "1 an admquate 
measure in the "alawian context. Bath nominal "1 and 
real "1 are plotted. The increase in the nominal Maney 
supply si•ply reflects a need for inflationary 
ca.pensation since real money supply holds a fairly 
constant level, with no increases registered by the 
fourth quarter figure of 1991, aver the 1991 first 
quarter figure. The ever-widening gap betM&en nominal 
"1 and real "1 attests to the prevalent waes of 
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inflation during the period; this will be explored 
shortly. The constancy of the real Ml bears testimony 
to the monetary officials' commitment to following the 
IMF's sour prescription of low money growth. 
Figure 5 is a duoplot of the logarithm of the 
consuater price index (CPI) and the level of inflation 
for Malawi (,..asured as the rate of change in the log 
of quarterly CPI). The logarithm of the CPI displays a 
continuous rise over the entire period under study. 
Inflation shows sharp and sudden non-steady swings 
throughout the period. These swings are probably due to 
transportation problems stemaing from the volatile and 
intricate civil war in neighboring Mozambique, and to 
drought conditions. Little solace can be derived from 
the fact that inflation fell significantly from a forty 
plus figure in 1987 to relatively stable teens between 
1989 and 1991. The prevalence of inflation once again 
manifests itself in the significant and growing gap 
between the nominal and real exchange rates of Figure 
6. 
Figure 7 shows the total level of nominal and real 
credit available to both the central government and the 
private sector, from the banking system. A break down 
of credit available to the specific sectors would be 
most desirable for the purposes of analysis; 
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unfortunately data was unprocurable. The nominal level 
posts a steady increase in available credit for the 
entire 1980's decade. An examination of the real credit 
level, however shows an overall decline by the end of 
the decade. This serves as evidence to the success of 
the monetary authorities in controlling the level of 
credit. This success may be attributed to the 
afore-discussed package-deal and comprehensive 
approaches to demand management (chapter 2) espoused by 
the monetary authorities. There is no reason to believe 
that the reduced level of real credit is due to reduced 
demand for it. O..and for credit has always been 
strong, which is exactly why the MOnetary officials 
specifically targeted credit as a demand management 
measure. 
Figure 8 depicts plots of government expenditures 
and budget surplus. The two variables are symmetrical 
because the more the government spends, the •ore 
negative the surplus will be, by accounting necessity, 
irrespective of whether government revenues go up or 
not. The expenditures do not exhibit a big increase 
within the period under study. However, the margin of 
fluctuation does widen somewhat in the post-1985 
period. With a few exceptions, the budget experienced 
chronic deficits for the whole period. 
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Figure 9 is a graphical illustration of nominal and 
real government spending for Malawi. Again, the 
government appears to have done a good job in 
exercising spending restraint; the real level of 
government spending is virtually constant within the 
decade, inspite of an annual population increase in 
excess of 3% per annu•. A more fruitful way of 
analyzing govern ... nt expenditures and deficits thereof 
is to look at expenditures and deficits as percentages 
of gross domestic product (GDP). Unfortunately, the 
relevant quarterly GDP data was unattainable. 
Figure 10 shcnts the total level of foreign exchange 
reserves available to the whole country and the level 
of foreign assets held by the whole country abroad. 
During the period between 1981 and 1987, foreign 
exchange reserves fell slightly despite the structural 
adjust....,t .. asures, including devaluation. After 1987 
the trend was a rising one, most likely because of 
foreign aid rather than superior export perfor•ance and 
i•port curtailment. 
Foreign asset holdings tended to follow the pattern 
of foreign exchange reserves up to the aiddle of 1985. 
After that, they Ment into inexplicable fluctuations. 
Again, a more worthwhile approach MOUld have been to 
exa•ine a breakdown of these variables by sectors to 
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draw 1ROre specific conclusions. Steps in that direction 
Mere once again thwarted by data unavailability. 
3.3. RESRESSION ANALYSIS. 
In considering the theoretical regression models for 
this project, scatterplots were generated for the 
relevant variables. A close examination of these 
scatterplots (Appendix A, figures 16-26) revealed non-
linear patterns. A lDQ-linear specification was opted 
for because it circu•vents the non-linearity problem, 
and because it per•its the discussion of the slope 
coefficients in terms of percentages. With these two 
considerations in mind, the generic .adel was specified 
as follows:-
Loglmports~=aO+a1Logl1gdp~+a2Log(Pf~/Pd~)+a3LogExgrt~+e~ 
The relevant prices and exchange rates varied 
depending on the trade partner involved. An aO of 
greater than zero was anticipated because an autonomous 
level of necessary imports that a country needs 
regardless of prices, income or exchange rate is to be 
expected. An al of greater than zero was also expected 
because as a country•s income increases, its ability to 
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import should increase as well. An a2 of less than zero 
was theorized because the law of demand would suggest 
that as relative prices increase, the level of imports 
should decrease. Finally, an a3 of less than zero was 
also anticipated because as the exchange rate 
increases, a country has to pay MDre in terms of 
domestic currency for the same level of imports as 
before and as such its ability to i•port lessens. 
3.4. RE&RESSION RESULTS. 
3.4.1. MALAWI VS USA. 
After esti•ation with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
the results were found to be seriously autocorrelated 
(Durbin-Watson statistic was 1.19) and consequently 
Generalized Least Squares was run instead. The AR(!) 
technique on MicroTsp, which uses the Cochran-Orcutt 
iterative method was utilized. The results are depicted 
in Table 1.1. below. 
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Coefficient 
t-score 
Sig. level 
R-squared 
A. R-squared 
F-statistic 
F-sig. level 
N 
DF 
Rho 
Constant 
22.23 
5.30 
o. 5'X. 
0.94 
0.94 
154 
o. 5'X. 
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39 
0.87 
Table 1.1. 
LMGDP LPUSA LERUSA 
0.18 -1.50 0.23 
2.35 -3.16 0.74 
0.5'X. 0.5'X. Insignif. 
The value of the constant was obtained by taking the 
figure reported by the GLS results and dividing it by 
(1-Rho) since GLS does not report an accurate figure 
for the constant. The constant was found to be 22.23; 
however, the constant term, as a general rule, does not 
merit economic interpretation because of two reasons. 
First, the error term is generated, in part, by the 
omission of a number of marginal independent variables, 
the average effect of which is included in the constant 
term. In this case, the constant term collects all the 
explanatory power that the logarithms of MGDP, relative 
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prices and exchange rate are not responsible for. 
Second, while the constant term is the value of the 
dependent variable when all the afore-•entioned 
independent variables and the error term are zero, 
frequently the values of the variables used for 
econo•ic analysis are positive. Consequently, the 
origin lies outside the sample range, and trying to 
estimate it increases the likelihood of error. With 
this in mind, it should suffice to know that, ideally, 
the constant represents an autonomous level of the 
Malawian i•ports. 
The coefficients far LMGDP and LPUSA all turned out 
to have theoretically expected signs. The parameter for 
Ll1GDP was 0.18 and was significant at the 0.5X level. 
This figure should be interpreted to mean that, holding 
everything else constant, a one percent increase in 
Malawi·s income would lead to an increase in i•port 
level by O.lBX. This figure is also known as the 
•arginal propensity to i•port. The parameter for 
relative prices was -1.5, and significant at the 0.5X 
level, which should be interpreted to mean that a one 
percent increase in relative prices would decrease 
Malawi•s imports by 1.5X, everything else being held 
constant. 
However, the parameter for LERUSA was 0.23 and took 
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on an unexpected and insignificant sign. This should 
suggest that the exchange rate does not impact imports, 
at least in the Malawian context. A lagged exchange 
rate was considered but since there was no segmentation 
in the exchange rate, the results were not improved. 
Figure 11 (Appendix A) does not show any segmentation 
in the exchange rate. 
An adjusted R-squared of 0.94 suggests that LMGDP, 
LPUSA and LERUSA explain 94X of the variation in LIMPO, 
which represents quite an impressive fit. The F-
statistic was 154, and the model was significant at the 
O. 5X level. 
The independent variables are multicollinear, which 
ordinarily leads to unreliable coefficients (Table 1.2 
below). 
Table 1.2. 
Correlation 
LMGDP vs LPUSA -0.44 
LMGDP vs LERUSA 0.44 
LPUSA vs LERUSA -0.97 
t-score 
-3.18 
3.18 
-10.66 
Sig. level. 
o.sx 
o.sx 
0.5X 
The multicollinearity does not seem to cause any 
problems because, for the most part, expected signs for 
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the independent variables were achieved and because the 
t-scores were overwhelmingly significant. The raw 
regression runs are available in Appendix B (p12-14). 
3.4.2. 1'1ALAWI VS UK. 
After estimation with Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), the results were found to be seriously 
autocorrelated (Durbin-Watson statistic was 0.45) and 
consequently Generalized Least Squares was run instead. 
, 
The results are depicted in Table 2.1. below. 
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Table 2.1. 
Constant U1GDP LPUK LERUK 
Coefficient 17.75 0.21 -1.24 0.84 
t-score 5.56 2.66 -3.09 1.15 
Sig. level 0.5'X 0.5'X 0.5'X insig. 
A-squared 0.94 
A. A-squared 0.93 
F-statistic 151 
F-sig. level 0.5'X 
N 43 
DF 39 
Rho 0.84 
The constant was found in a similar •anner as the one 
for the U.S. case. Again, the figure of 17.75 does not 
merit serious interpretation. 
The coefficients for LMGDP and LPUK all turned out 
to have theoretically expected signs. The parameter for 
Lt1GDP was 0.21 and was significant at the 0.5'X level. 
This figure should be interpreted to mean that, holding 
everything else constant, a one percent increase in 
Malawi's income would lead to an increase in import 
level by 0.21'X. This figure is also known as the 
marginal propensity to import. The parameter for 
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relative prices was -1.24, and significant at the 0.5X 
level, which should be interpreted to mean that a one 
percent increase in relative prices MC>Uld decrease 
Malawi's i•ports by 1.24X holding everything else 
constant. 
HDNltver, the parameter for LERUK was 0.84 and took 
on an uneMpected and insignificant sign. This should 
suggest that the eMchange rate does not i•pact i•ports, 
at least in the Malawian conteMt. A lagged exchange 
rate was considered but since there was no segmentation 
in the eMchange rate, the results were not improved. 
Figure 12 (AppendiM A) does not show any segAtentation 
in the eMchange rate. 
An adjusted R-squared of 0.93 suggests that L"6DP, 
LPUK and LERUK eMplain 93X of the variation in LIHPO, 
which represents quite an i•pressive fit. The F-
statistic was 151, and the .adel was significant at the 
0.5X level. 
The independent variables ar• .ulticollinear (Table 
2.2 belDM), which nor•ally leads to unreliable 
coefficients. 
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UtGDP vs LPUK 
Ll'IGDP vs LERUK 
LPUK vs LERUK 
Table 2.2. 
Correlation 
-0.42 
0.40 
-0.96 
t-score Sig.level. 
-2.99 
2.82 
-22.22 
0.5X 
0.5X 
0.5X 
However, the multicollinearity does not seem to cause 
any probletns because, for the most part, expected 
results Nere achieved. The raw regression runs are 
available in Appendix B (p9-11). 
3.4.3. MALAWI VS GERMANY. 
After estimation with Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), the results 11tere found to be seriously 
autocorrelated (Durbin-Watson statistic was 0.89) and 
consequently Generalized Least Squares was run instead. 
The results are depicted in Table 3.1. below. 
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Table 3.1. 
Constant Lt1GDP LPG LER6 
Coefficient 17.52 0.19 -1.27 0.02 
t-score 6.00 2.43 -3.23 0.06 
SiQ. level o. 5'X. 0. 5'X. o. 5'X. Insig. 
R-squared 0.94 
A. R-squared 0.94 
F-statistic 156 
F-sig. level 0. 5'X. 
N 43 
DF 39 
Rho 0.83 
The constant was found in a similar manner as the 
one for the U.S. case. Again, the figure of 17.52 does 
not merit serious interpretation. 
The coefficients for LMGDP and LPG all turned out to 
have theoretically expected signs. The parameter for 
LMGDP was 0.19 and was significant at the 0.5'X. level. 
This figure should be interpreted to mean that, holding 
everything else constant, a one percent increase in 
Malawi's income would lead to an increase in import 
level by 0.19'X.. This figure is also known as the 
marginal propensity to import. The parameter for 
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relative prices was -1.27, and significant at the 0.51. 
level, which should be interpreted to mean that a one 
percent increase in relative prices t111DUld decrease 
Malawi's i•ports by 1.27%, holding everything else 
constant. 
HoMever, the parameter for LERG was 0.02 and took on 
an unexpected and insignificant sign. This should 
suggest that the exchange rate does not i•pact imports, 
at least in the Malawian context. A lagged exchange 
rate was considered but since there was no seg1111tOtatian 
in the exchange rate, the results were not improved. 
Figure 13 (Appendix A) does not show any segmentation 
in the exchange rate. 
An adjusted R-squared of 0.94 suggests that LttGDP, 
LPG and LERG explain 94% of the variation in LIMPO, 
which represents quite an impressive fit. The F-
statistic was 156, and the model was significant at the 
0.5X level. 
The independent variables are multicollinear (Table 
3.2 below), which ordinarily leads to biased estimates. 
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Ll1GDP vs LPG 
Ll1GDP vs LERG 
LPG vs LERG 
Table 3.2. 
Correlation 
-0.45 
0.40 
-0.97 
t-score 
-3.26 
2.82 
-10.66 
Sig. level 
0.5X 
0.5X 
0.5X 
The multicollinearity does not seem to cause any 
problems because, for the most part, expected signs and 
strong t-scores Mere achieved. The raw regression runs 
are available in Appendix B (p4-6). 
3.4.4. MALAWI VS S. AFRICA. 
After esti•ation with Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), the results were found to be seriously 
autocorrelated (Durbin-Watson statistic was 0.62) and 
consequently Generalized Least Squares was run instead. 
The results are depicted in Table 4.1. below. 
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Table 4.1. 
Constant LMGDP LPSA LE RSA 
Coefficient 46000 0.19 -1.48 0.42 
t-score 0.001 2.59 -2.81 2.45 
Sig. level insig. o.sx 0.5X 0.5X 
R-squared 0.94 
A. R-squared 0.94 
F-statistic 153 
F-sig. level 0.5X 
N 43 
DF 39 
Rho 0.99 
The constant was found in a si•ilar •anner as the 
one for the U.S. case. Again, the figure of 46000 does 
not merit serious interpretation. 
The coefficients for LMGDP and LPSA all turned out 
. 
to have theoretically expected signs. The parameter for 
LMGDP was 0.19 and was significant at the 0.5X level. 
This figure should be interpreted to mean that, holding 
everything else constant, a one percent increase in 
Malawi's income would lead to an increase in import 
level by 0.19X. This figure is also known as the 
marginal propensity to i•port. The parameter for 
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relative prices was -1.49, and significant at the 0.57. 
level, which should be interpreted to mean that a one 
percent increase in relative prices would decrease 
Halawi's i•ports by 1.497.. 
The coefficient for LERSA, however took on an 
unexpected sign (0.42) and was significant at the 0.57. 
level. This unorthodox finding can be rationalized as 
being a consequence of the depreciation of both the 
kwacha and the rand against the currencies of the major 
industrial superpowers, which .. ans that the tMO 
currencies Mere moving in the stUMt direction. Since 
i•ports were increasing overall during the period under 
study, a positive relationship was bound to develop 
betMeen i•ports and the exchange rate. Lagging the 
exchange rate did not produce any pra.ising results 
since the exchange rate was not seg111ented (see Appendix 
B, Figure 15). 
An adjusted R-squared of 0.94 suggests that LHGDP, 
LPSA and LERSA explain 947. of the variation in LIHPO, 
which represents quite an i•pressive fit. The F-
statistic was 153, and the model was significant at the 
0.57. level. 
The independent variables are multicollinear (Table 
4.2 below), which ordinarily leads to biased estimates. 
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Table 4.2. 
Correlation t-score Sig.level 
Ll1GDP vs LPSA -0.32 -2.18 2.5'X 
LMGDP vs LERSA 0.09 1.81 5'X 
LPSA vs LERSA -0.27 -0.58 lnsig. 
However, the multicollinearity does not seem to cause 
any problems because, for the mast part, expected signs 
and decent t-scores were achieved. As the results of 
Table 4.2 indicate, multicollinearity was present among 
the independent variables, but not quite as much as for 
the previous countries. The raw regression runs are 
available in Appendix 8 (pl-3). 
3,4.5. ttALAWI YS JAPAN. 
After estimation with OLS, the following 
results were secured:-
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Table 5.1. 
Constant LMGDP LPJ LERJP 
Coefficient -1.77 0.18 -2.2 -0.9 
t-score -2.13 1.68 -11.41 -6.58 
Sig. level 2.5X 5.0X 0.5X 0.5X 
DW 1.24 
R-squared 0.93 
A. R-squared 0.92 
F-stat. 172 
F-sig. level 0.5X 
N 44 
DF 40 
The constant was observed to be -1.77 and does not 
•ake any econa.ic sense whatsoever, even though it was 
significant at the 2.5X level. The coefficient for 
Ll1BDP was 0.18 representing a •arginal propensity to 
import of that magnitude, which is significant at the 
5X level. This finding IMltans that if Halawi's income 
increases by one percent, her imports will increase by 
0.18X, holding everything else constant. The parameter 
for relative prices was -2.2 and was significant at the 
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0.5X level. This result means that if relative prices 
increase by lX, Malawi will curtail her imports by 
2.2x, holding everything else constant. The coefficient 
for LERJP ..as -0.9 and was significant at the 0.5X 
level. This means that if Malawi devalues her currency 
by one percent, her imports will be reduced by 0.9X, 
holding everything else constant. Relative prices and 
the exchange rate then se .. to matter a great deal when 
Malawi imports from Japan. In fact, trade with Japan is 
the only instance in which the exchange rate aatters. 
A Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.24 resulted in an 
inconclusive test for autocorrelation. Since the 
coefficients attained expected signs, and were 
significant, it was not deemed necessary to apply GLS 
to the data. 
An ff-adjusted squared of 0.92 constitutes a very 
good fit for the llKXlel. The F-value of 172 deemed the 
overall model significant at the 0.5X level. 
A test for multicollinearity suggested that it 
indeed existed, as shown below in Table 5.2. below. 
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LMGDP vs LPJ 
LMGDP vs LERJP 
LPJ vs LERJP 
Table 5.2. 
Correlation 
-0.45 
0.39 
-0.96 
t-score 
-3.26 
-2.74 
-22.22 
Sig. level 
0.5X 
0.5X 
0.5X 
Since the coefficients acquired expected signs and 
were highly significant it can be presu•ed that the 
multicollinearity does not cause severe problems in the 
findings of the model. 
Since Figure 14 (Appendix A) shows no exchange rate 
seglDfiPfltation, and since the exchange rate took on an 
expected sign, it was not necessary to try a lagged 
tnedel. The raw regression results are available in 
Appendix B (p7-8). 
3.5. su""ARY OF RESULTS. 
As of 1989, about 21X of Malawi's imports ca .. from 
the UK, 46X from South Africa, BX from Japan, 5X from 
the USA, and 10X fro• Germany. These countries account 
for 90X of Malawi's imports. From, the regression 
results, a trade-weighted marginal propensity to import 
of about 0.17 has been calculated. This implies that 
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overall, if "alawi's income rises by 11., her imports 
increase by 0.171.. This figure, in reality, may sound 
plausible. However, some caution is in order since the 
index for industrial production was used as a proxy for 
quarterly GNP. 
Overall, the results indicate that "•lawi's imports 
are positively sensitive to income, as well as being 
negatively sensitive to relative prices. However, the 
exchange rate does not appear to be a significant 
variable in the import trade of "•lawi, with the 
exception of trade with Japan. This result is 
disturbing in light of the fact that devaluation is 
supposed to curb i•ports through the responsiveness of 
the exchange rate. It appears that that the J-curve 
exists because the exchange rate affected the export 
sector iaore than it did, the import sector. 
It is also interesting to note that "alawi's imports 
are fairly price-elastic. The elasticities range from a 
low of 1.24 with respect to the UK, through 1.27 for 
Germany, and 1.48 for South Africa, ta 1.5 for the USA 
and to a high of 2.2 for Japan. These figures are, of 
course, taken from the GLS results, except for the case 
of Japan where the OLS results were used. 
There is SDtlle evidence of a wave-like pattern in the 
net exports and the balance of payments, as had been 
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previously theorized. However, it would be 
foolhardiness at its worst to attribute this pattern 
solely to the J-curve theory, in the advent of 
intervening variables that have been suggested before 
(e.g. droughts and transportation bottlenecks). 
Besides, the regression results do not show the 
exchange rate to be an important determinant of import 
levels. Finally, it should also be kept in mind that 
changes in the nominal exchange rate failed to sustain 
the real exchange rate. 
73 
CHAPTER 4. 
4.1. POLICY REconnENDATJONS. 
It is quite evident that although Malawi has been 
operating under structural adjustment status for over a 
decade, her balance of payments probletns persist and 
defy resolution to date. This is in tha wake of the 
fact that the government has tried to adhere to 
prescribed reform measures as faithfully as is 
politically palatable. It is likely that the balance of 
payments enigma is rooted in structural i•balances. 
Profligacies in the export sector have nullified 
crucial foreign exchange acquisitions that are 
indispensable for debt repayment. There is an urgent 
need to diversify the export base. Malawi cannot afford 
to continue depending on tobacco as the only viable 
foreign exchange earner. Att .. pts should be made to 
experilBllnt with new non-traditional exports in order 
for Malawi to be able to effectively share in the 
spoils of the green revolution. 
It would also be wise for the government and foreign 
donors to encourage local and foreign investment in the 
light manufacturing subsector. This is necessary 
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because diversification of the agricultural base alone 
is an inadequate policy Measure since agricultural 
products are susceptible to volatile world prices and 
unpredictable weather patterns. 
Curtailment of i•ports is quite a ne•esis because 
the bulk of imports includes such things as durable 
consumer goods, and physical capital for which Malawi 
is incapable of substituting. A supply side approach to 
the proble•s will be .are fruitful. Si•ple 
Mechanization that increases production without causing 
une•ployment is desirable. This would especially be 
useful in agriculture; smallholder farMers could be 
provided with affordable ploughs rather than relatively 
inefficient hoes. The same can be said of irrigation 
schetnes. Short-run costs should be weighed against 
long-run benefits, especially when incidents of drought 
see• to be occurring with increasing frequency. 
Next, economic progress will ra.ain a fleeting 
illusion to be pursued by Malawi in particular, and the 
South Central African region in general, unless there 
is a satisfactory and lasting resolution to the geo-
political debauchery in Moza•bique. The civil war in 
Mozambique has caused serious transportation squeezes 
whose real costs have not been well-understood to date, 
except in cases where they have translated into high 
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levels of inflation. The United Nations could help 
along the lines of diplomacy and •ilitary force if 
necessary. 
Next, the government still needs to redouble its 
efforts in its attempt to control the population 
growth. ttalawi has one of the highest population 
densities in Africa, yet her population continues to 
grow at a disturbing rate of IBDre than 3.2X per annum. 
It is apparent, a fortiori, that this growth rate is 
bound to wipe out any meager economic gains the country 
•akes in the foreseeable future. Other issues such as 
illiteracy and corruption also need to be addressed. 
The critics of the IMF are not asking for a mea 
culpa fratn the IMF, but they would like the IMF and 
other donors to understand that there are no overnight 
solutions to Malawi·s problems and as such, 
deflationary demand policies are no effective panacea, 
neither in the short-run nor in the long-run. Much as 
it is clear that the IMF is not a development 
organization, there is no reason to believe that the 
Fund cannot adjust to perform in that capacity. 
With the political system on the verge of turning 
into an open democracy in Malawi, more foreign aid and 
private capital inflows might be on the way. This, 
coupled with increased regional economic cooperation, 
76 
may be a source for guarded optimism as Malawi looks to 
the future. 
4.2. SUBBESTIDNS FDR FURTHER RESEARCH. 
It appears that the general public, the bureaucrats 
and the international donors are unaware of the real 
costs of some of the problems cited in this project, as 
can be deduced from their reticence to deal with the 
problems. Studies focusing on the estimation of 
foregone foreign exchange earnings due to lack of 
diversification in the export sector are warranted. 
Equally in order, are studies seeking to expose 
economic losses due to population growth, illiteracy 
and transportation bottlenecks. Common experience would 
indicate that when people see costs in ter•& of 
figures, they quickly understand the gravity of the 
situation, and as such they respond with the necessary 
urgency. 
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Appendix A. 
Figure 1. 
Malawi's Nominal Exports 1'1nd Imports in Millions of 
Kwacha plotted with Nominal and Real Exchange Rates 
500---------------------------------------------. 
Exchange rates given as Kwacha/US $ multiplied 
by 100 for proper scaling. 
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Figure 2. 
Malawi's Net Exports and Bah1nce of Payments (Bop) 
Nominal and Real exchange giYen ll5 (K/US $)x100 
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Figure 3. 
Malawi'5 Volumes of Imports and Exporte (1980=100) 
Exohanie Rates given as {K/US$)x100. 
300--------------------------------------------
250 dl etc - devalu ation5 
200 
150 
100 
50 
d1 d2 d3 d4-d5 d6 d7 o.,.,_,........_. __ ,_...,...,.~,........_.--,........_.----............ --............ --............ --..._...___, 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 
1
-VEXPO --- NNER I 
----- VIMPO ---· NRER 
ge 
Appendix A. 
Figure 4. 
Malawi's Nominal and Real Money Supply in Millions 
of Kwacha. Real ml= m1x(100/cpi) 
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Figure 5. 
Malawi's level of inflation (7./qtr) and the log of CPI 
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Figure 6. 
Malawi'5 Exchange Rates giYen as K/US$. 
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Figure ,._ 
The Total level of available Nominal and Real Domestic 
Credit. in Malawi in Millions of Kwacha. 
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Figure 8. 
Malawi's Government Expenditures (Nominal) and 
Budget Surplus (-surplus=deficit) in KMillion. 
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Figure 9. 
Malawi's Real and Nominal Government Expenditures 
in KMillion. Real=Nominal x (100/CPI) 
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Figure 10. 
Malawi's Total Foreign Exchange Reserves and 
Holdings of Foreign Assets Abroad in US$Million. 
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Figure 11. 
Mala,.,~i/USA Nominal Exchange Rat.e 
(Kw rt.ch a/US $) 
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Figure 1Z. 
Malawi/UK Nominfll Exchange Rrtte 
(K·w ach a./ Sterling) 
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figure 13. 
Mahtwi./Germany Exchange Rate 
(Kvr ach a/Mark) 
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Figure 14. 
Malawi/Japan Nominli.l Exchange Rate 
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Figure 15. 
Mall'lwi/South Africa Nominttl Exchhnge Rate 
(K~· aoh a/Rand 
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Figure 16. 
}.h1h1"\\.,.i 1s Imports vs Mgdp 
(lmpo in KMillion, Mgdp at 197.0=100) 
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Figure 17. 
Malawi's imports Ys (USCPI/MCPI) 
(Impo in KMillion) 400---------------------------------
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Figure 18. 
Mal&-vd's Imports vs US Exchan?e Rate 
(Impo in KMillion, ERUSA &.t. K1 $) 
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Figure 19. 
Malawi's Imports Y5 (UKCPI/MCPI) 
(lmpo in KMillion) 
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figure 20. 
Malawi'5 Imports vs UK Exchange Rate 
(lmpo in KMillion, Eruk at. K/St.erling) 400---------------------------------
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Figure 21. 
Mahrvd's Imports Y5 ~TCPI/MCPI 
(Impo in KMillion) 
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Figure ZZ. 
Mala-wi'5 Import.s vs Japan Exchhnge 
(lmpo in KMillion, Erjp at. K/Yen) 400--------------------------------, 
300-
""•oo ,.;. -
100-
+ 
+ 
+ 
++ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
++ 
+ + +• + 
0..,....------~.-----....,------..-------.,------~ 
0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015 o.ozo O.OZ5 
ERJP 
Appendix A. 
F. ')') igure """'. 
Mahtwi's Imports vs GCPI/MCPI 
(lmpo in KMillion) 
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Figure 24. 
Malawi's Imports vs Germany Exchange 
(Impo in KMillion, Erg at K/Mark) 
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Figure Z5. 
Malawi's Import5 v3 SACPI/MCPI 
(Impo in KMillion) 
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figure 26. 
Mrdawi's Imports Y5 S.Africa Exchflnge 
(Impo in KMillion, Ersa at. K/Rand) 
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1. 
Date: 6-16-1993 I Time: 16:33 
SMPL range: 1981.1 - 1991.4 
Number of observations: 44 
Variable Mean 
LIMPO 4.7243553 
LMGDP 4.6185795 
LPSA -0.0302365 
LERSA -0.0242873 
LIMPO,LIMPO 
LIMPO,LMGDP 
LIMPO.LPSA 
LIMPO.LERSA 
LMGDP,LMGDP 
LMGDP.LPSA 
LMGDP,LERSA 
LPSA,LPSA 
LPSA,LERSA 
LERSA,LERSA 
Repeat the output ? (P,S,ENTER) 
S.D. 
0.5398270 
0.2442636 
0.1034604 
0.1586669 
Covariance 
0.2847902 
0.0664973 
-0.0450432 
0.0357919 
0.0583087 
-0.0081002 
0.0035442 
0.0104608 
-0.0044446 
0.0246030 
Maximum 
5.8435450 
5.0498560 
0.1170164 
0.1570037 
Minimum 
4.0775380 
3.9702920 
-0.2150109 
-0.5621190 
Correlation 
1.0000000 
0.5160298 
-0.8252475 
0.4275900 
1.0000000 
-0.3279797 
0.0935749 
1.0000000 
-0.2770467 
1.0000000 
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2. 
LS // Dependent 
Date: 6-16-1993 I Time: 16:34 
SMPL range: 1981.1 - 1991.4 
Number of observations: 44 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
c 1.8357677 
LMGDP 0.6061841 
LPSA -3.5261641 
LERSA 0.7304447 
R-sguared 
Adjusted R-sguared 
S.E. of regression 
Los likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.791049 
0.775378 
0.255847 
-0.356773 
0.623276 
Variable is LIMPO 
STD. ERROR 
0.7780960 
0.1690841 
0.4136366 
0.2559195 
T-STAT. 
2.3593074 
3.5851049 
-8.5247866 
2.8541969 
Mean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of sguared resid 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Display the Coefficient Covariance Matrix ? (P,S,ENTER) 
2-TAIL SIG. 
0.0233 
0.0009 
0.0000 
0.0068 
4.724355 
0.539827 
2.618311 
50.47761 
0.000000 
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3. 
LS // Dependent Variable is LIMPO 
Date: 6-16-1993 I Time: 16:35 
SMPL range: 1981.2 - 1991.4 
Number of observations: 43 
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR 
c 459.90071 416172.59 
LMGDP 0.1858125 0.0718424 
LPSA -1.4840191 0.5282039 
LERSA 0.4226747 0.1725705 
AR{l) 0.9999332 0.0609954 
T-STAT. 
0.0011051 
2.5863915 
-2.8095573 
2.4492868 
16.393578 
R-sguared 
Adjusted R-sguared 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.941402 
0.935234 
0.137792 
26.86965 
2.508309 
Mean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared resid 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Display the Coefficient Covariance Matrix ? (P,S,ENTER) 
2-TAIL SIG. 
0.9991 
0.0137 
0.0078 
0.0190 
0.0000 
4.735092 
0.541441 
0.721496 
152.6219 
0.000000 
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4. 
Date: 6-14-1993 / Time: 15:33 
SMPL range: 1981.1 - 1991.4 
Number of observations: 44 
Variable Mean 
LIMPO 4.7243553 
LMGDP 4.6185795 
LPG -0.6530486 
LERG -0.1626646 
LIMPO,LIMPO 
LIMPO,LMGDP 
LIMPO,LPG 
LIMPO,LERG 
LMGDP,LMGDP 
LMGDP,LPG 
LMGDP,LERG 
LPG,LPG 
LPG,LERG 
LERG,LERG 
Repeat the output ? (P,S,ENTER) 
S.D. 
0.5398270 
0.2442636 
0.4682730 
0.5799936 
Covariance 
0.2847902 
0.0664973 
-0.2263841 
0.2599363 
0.0583087 
-0.0503101 
0.0567032 
0.2142960 
-0.2587230 
0.3287473 
Maximum Minimum 
5.8435450 4.0775380 
5.0498560 3.9702920 
-0.0028077 -1.3721100 
0.5596158 -0.9675840 
Correlation 
1.0000000 
0.5160298 
-0.9163819 
0.8495196 
1.0000000 
-0.4500713 
0.4095526 
1.0000000 
-0.9747582 
1.0000000 
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5. 
LS // Dependent 
Date: 6-14-1993 I Time: 15:34 
SMPL range: 1981.1 - 1991.4 
Number of observations: 44 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
c 2.3231034 
LMGDP 0.2209270 
LPG -1.9246814 
LERG . -0. 7621362 
R-sguared 
Adjusted R-sguared 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.885921 
0.877365 
0.189044 
12.95768 
0.668140 
Variable is LIMPO 
STD. ERROR 
0.6056350 
0.1336031 
0.2847678 
0.2250522 
T-STAT. 
3.8358141 
1.6536065 
-6.7587751 
-3.3864857 
Mean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of sguared resid 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Display the Coefficient Covariance Matrix ? (P,S,ENTER) 
2-TAIL SIG. 
0.0004 
0.1060 
0.0000 
0.0016 
4.724355 
0.539827 
1.429503 
103.5443 
0.000000 
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6. 
LS // Dependent Variable is LIMPO 
Date: 6-14-1993 I Time: 15:34 
SMPL range: 1981.2 - 1991.4 
Number of observations: 43 
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR 
c 2.9798949 0.4966555 
LMGDP 0.1917905 0.0790232 
LPG -1.2690572 0.3930178 
LERG 0.0239098 0.3823990 
AR(l) 0.8278268 0.1399953 
T-STAT. 
5.9999239 
2.4270157 
-3.2290066 
0.0625259 
5.9132455 
R-sguared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.942770 
0.936746 
0.136175 
27.37750 
2.353208 
Mean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared resid 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Display the Coefficient Covariance Matrix ? (P,S,ENTER) 
2-TAIL SIG. 
0.0000 
0.0201 
0.0026 
0.9505 
0.0000 
4.735092 
0.541441 
0.704653 
156.4970 
0.000000 
Appendix B. 
7. 
Date: 6-14-1993 / Time: 15:30 
SMPL range: 1981.l - 1991.4 
Number of obeervatione: 44 
Variable Mean 
LIMPO 4.7243553 
LMGDP 4.6185795 
LPJ -0.6988029 
LERJP -4.6036300 
LIMPO,LIMPO 
LIMPO,LMGDP 
LIMPO,LPJ 
LIMPO,LERJP 
LMGDP,LMGDP 
LMGDP,LPJ 
LMGDP,LERJP 
LPJ,LPJ 
LPJ,LERJP 
LERJP,LERJP 
Repeat the output ? (P,S,ENTER) 
S.D. 
0.5398270 
0.2442636 
0.4709984 
0.6479196 
Covariance 
0.2847902 
0.0664973 
-0.2272570 
0.2752533 
0.0583087 
-0.0507751 
0.0618491 
0.2167977 
-0.2877585 
0.4102589 
Maximum Minimum 
5.8435450 4.0775380 
5.0498560 3.9702920 
-0.0188685 -1.4246130 
-3.8776220 -5.5727540 
Correlation 
1.0000000 
0.5160298 
-0.9145922 
0.8052690 
1.0000000 
-0.4516029 
0.3998873 
1.0000000 
-0.9648768 
1.0000000 
Appendix B. 
8. 
LS // Dependent 
Date: 6-14-1993 I Time: 15:31 
SMPL range: 1981.l - 1991.4 
Number of observations: 44 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
c -1.7660163 
LMGDP 0.1787800 
LPJ -2.1969628 
LERJP -0.8969918 
R-sguared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.927924 
0.922518 
0.150264 
23.05956 
1.242662 
Variable ie LIMPO 
STD. ERROR 
0.8275580 
0.1063973 
0.1925165 
0.1362307 
T-STAT. 
-2.1340092 
1.6803051 
-11. 411813 
-6.5843595 
Mean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared resid 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statietic) 
Display the Coefficient Covariance Matrix ? (P,S,ENTER) 
2-TAIL SIG. 
0.0390 
0.1007 
0.0000 
0.0000 
4.724355 
0.539827 
0.903166 
171. 6570 
0.000000 
Appendix B. 
9. 
Date: 6-14-1993 I Time: 15:12 
SMPL range: 1981.1 - 1991.4 
Number of observations: 44 
Variable Hean 
LIMPO 4.7243553 
LMGDP 4.6185795 
LPUK -0.4406857 
LERUK 1.0704353 
LIMPO,LIMPO 
LIMPO,LMGDP 
LIMPO,LPUK 
LIMPO,LERUK 
LMGDP,LMGDP 
LMGDP,LPUK 
LMGDP,LERUK 
LPUK,LPUK 
LPUK,LERUK 
LERUK,LERUK 
Repeat the output ? (P,S,ENTER) 
S.D. 
0.5398270 
0.2442636 
0.3537612 
0.4394603 
Covariance 
0.2847902 
0.0664973 
-0.1688007 
0.2020987 
0.0583087 
-0.0362810 
0.0426034 
0.1223028 
-0.1472075 
0.1887362 
Maximum Minimum 
5.8435450 4.0775380 
5.0498560 3.9702920 
0.0807614 -0.9683757 
1.7867470 0.4946962 
Correlation 
1.0000000 
0.5160298 
-0.9044689 
0.8717130 
1.0000000 
-0.4296297 
0.4061161 
1.0000000 
-0.9689117 
1.0000000 
Appendix B. 
10. 
LS // Dependent 
Date: 6-16-1993 / Time: 10:41 
SMPL range: 1981.1 - 1991.4 
Number of observations: 44 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
c 2.6052801 
LMGDP 0.3440329 
LPUK -1.3519558 
LERUK -0.0613356 
R-sguared 
Adjusted R-aquared 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.838135 
0.825995 
0.225183 
5.260536 
0.453889 
Variable is LIMPO 
STD. ERROR 
0.7295100 
0.1558483 
0.3974664 
0.3161694 
T-STAT. 
3.5712741 
2.2074864 
-3.4014345 
-0.1939960 
Mean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared resid 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-etatietic) 
Display the Coefficient Covariance Matrix ? (P,S,ENTER) 
2-TAIL SIG. 
0.0009 
0.0331 
0.0015 
0.8472 
4.724355 
0.539827 
2.028299 
69.03961 
0.000000 
Appendix B. 
11. 
LS // Dependent Variable 
Date: 6-14-1993 I Time: 15:15 
SMPL range: 1981.2 - 1991.4 
Number of observations: 43 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR 
c 2.8453494 0.5118126 
LMGDP 0.2094144 0.0788356 
LPUK -1.2359760 0.3996886 
LERUK 0.3320023 0.2886494 
AR(l) 0.8445982 0.1155193 
is LIMPO 
T-STAT. 
5.5593575 
2.6563434 
-3.0923474 
1.1501922 
7.3113156 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.940872 
0.934648 
0.138414 
26.67602 
2.320685 
Mean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared resid 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Display the Coefficient Covariance Matrix ? (P,S,ENTER) 
2-TAIL SIG. 
0.0000 
0.0115 
0.0037 
0.2573 
0.0000 
4.735092 
0.541441 
0.728023 
151.1684 
0.000000 
Appendix B. 
12. 
Date: 6-14-1993 I Time: 15:28 
SMPL range: 1981.1 - 1991.4 
Number of observations: 44 
Variable Mean 
LIMPO 4.7243553 
LMGDP 4.6185795 
LPUSA -0.5150133 
LERUSA 0.5831148 
LIMPO,LIMPO 
LIMPO,LMGDP 
LIMPO,LPUSA 
LIMPO,LERUSA 
LMGDP,LMGDP 
LMGDP,LPUSA 
LMGDP,LERUSA 
LPUSA,LPUSA 
LPUSA,LERUSA 
LERUSA,LERUSA 
Repeat the output ? (P,S,ENTER) 
S.D. 
0.5398270 
0.2442636 
0.3786336 
0.4079785 
Covariance 
0.2847902 
0.0664973 
-0.1801915 
0.1750302 
0.0583087 
-0.0402955 
0.0431340 
0.1401051 
-0.1464442 
0.1626636 
Maximum Minimum 
5.8435450 4.0775380 
5.0498560 3.9702920 
0.0456700 -1.1004940 
1.0818050 -0.1508229 
Correlation 
1.0000000 
0.5160298 
-0.9020792 
0.8132147 
1.0000000 
-0.4458231 
0.4429027 
1.0000000 
-0.9700626 
1.0000000 
Appendix B. 
13. 
LS // Dependent 
Date: 6-14-1993 / Time: 15:29 
SMPL range: 1981.l - 1991.4 
Number of obeervations: 44 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
c 2.5834205 
LMGDP 0.3450154 
LPUSA -2.6756373 
LERUSA -1.4243084 
R-sguared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.898109 
0.890467 
0.178660 
15.44352 
1.192466 
Variable ie LIMPO 
STD. ERROR 
0.5591287 
0.1247533 
0.2971179 
0.2753014 
T-STAT. 
4.6204398 
2.7655828 
-9.0053052 
-5.1736335 
Mean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared resid 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Display the Coefficient Covariance Matrix ? (P,S,ENTER) 
2-TAIL SIG. 
0.0000 
0.0086 
0.0000 
0.0000 
4.724355 
0.539827 
1. 276771 
117.5256 
0.000000 
Appendix B. 
14. 
LS // Dependent Variable is LIMPO 
Date: 6-14-1993 I Time: 15:04 
SMPL range: 1981.2 - 1991.4 
Number of observations: 43 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR 
c 2.8952943 0.5462935 
LMGDP 0.1833098 0.0779788 
LPUSA -1.4999436 0.4746198 
LERUSA 0.2336658 0.3144456 
AR(l) 0.8733323 0.0987831 
T-STAT. 
5.2998878 
2.3507659 
-3.1603054 
0.7431038 
8.8409073 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.941923 
0.935810 
0.137178 
27.06171 
2.431319 
Mean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared resid 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Display the Coefficient Covariance Matrix ? (P,S,ENTER) 
2-TAIL SIG. 
0.0000 
0.0240 
0.0031 
0.4620 
0.0000 
4.735092 
0.541441 
0.715080 
154.0767 
0.000000 
